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THE BANKRUPTCY PUZZLE
F. H. BUCKLEY and MARGARET F. BRINIG*
ABSTRACT
This article offers new evidence on the determinants of U.S. consumer bank-
ruptcy filing rates, which tripled from 1984 to 1991. The run-up in filing rates does
not appear to be a consequence of legal changes since the increase coincided with
Bankruptcy Code amendments designed to reduce filing rates by rejecting opportu-
nistic petitions. The run-up also coincided with a major economic boom and crested
with the 1991 recession. However, much of the variation in district filing rates is
attributable to differences in social variables, and we suggest that changes in social
norms might account for the increased bankruptcy filings. This article is therefore
a contribution to social capital explanations of behavior.
I. INTRODUCTION
O NE of the greatest puzzles in American bankruptcy law is how to ac-
count for the run-up in consumer filings from 1985 to 1991, when personal
filing rates tripled. One might expect to see an increase in filings during an
economic downturn, such as the Great Depression. However, the run-up
that began in 1985 coincided with the Reagan economic recovery and
crested with the 1991 recession. We would also expect increased filings on
a shift to a more prodebtor regime. But the major legal change during the
period was the 1984 Bankruptcy Code revisions which strengthened barri-
ers to debtor opportunism under Chapters 7 and 13.' One would therefore
have predicted a decline in filing rates, rather than the greatest increase
since World War II.
Our study presents new evidence on the determinants of consumer bank-
ruptcy during this period. We regressed consumer bankruptcy filing rates
on legal, economic, and social variables for 86 federal judicial districts from
* Buckley and Brinig are professors at the George Mason University School of Law. We
gratefully acknowledge the support of the Law and Economics Center of George Mason Uni-
versity School of Law and the helpful comments of Eric Posner, Eric Rasmusen, David
Skeel, Elizabeth Warren, anonymous referees of this journal, and participants at the Ameri-
can Law and Economics Association annual meeting in Chicago, May 1996.
Bankruptcy Reform and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub L No 98-353, 98 Stat 333
(1984), effective October 1984.
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FIGURE 1.-Personal bankruptcies, 1966-92; circles = annual filing rates per 1,000 adults;
cross marks = annual gross domestic product/adult in constant 1987 dollars
(10,000,000,000).
1980 to 1991. Legal variables were unable to account for the run-up in con-
sumer filings, and economic variables were scarcely more successful. How-
ever, social predictors, measuring differences in social norms and institu-
tions, were a powerful predictor of consumer filing rates, and we suggest
that the explosion in bankruptcy filings is in substantial part attributable to
a shift in social norms.
Section II describes the run-up in personal filings during the 1980s. Sec-
tion III reviews the determinants of bankruptcy, and Section IV describes
our model of the bankruptcy decision. Last, Section V presents our results.
Our principal finding is that differential social norms appear to explain
much of the variation in consumer filings over time and between districts.
II. THE BANKRUPTCY EXPLOSION
As may be seen in Figure 1, bankruptcy rates remained relatively stable
during the 15 years that preceded the adoption of the new Bankruptcy Code
in 1979.2 Each year, about one adult in a thousand filed a nonbusiness bank-
2 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub L No 95-598, 92 Stat 2549 (effective October 1,
1979), codified and amended as 11 USCA §§ 101-1330 (West 1996) (hereafter "Bankruptcy
Code").
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ruptcy petition under Chapters 7, 11, or 13. The filing rate increased to 1.26
per 1,000 adults in 1980 and to 1.37 in 1981, and for the next few years it
remained stable at the higher rate. However, the rate soon exploded, from
1.20 in 1984 to 3.52 per 1,000 adults in 1992. At current levels, 1 percent
of American adults files for personal bankruptcy every 3 years. What was
formerly a rarity is now almost commonplace.
3
The increase in filing rates defies easy analysis. It coincided with the
Reagan recovery and eased off during the subsequent economic downturn.
Filing rates were also higher in high-growth areas in the South and West.
In addition, the increase in filing rates followed a reduction in the tax sub-
sidy for personal leverage. The 1986 amendments to the Income Tax Code
phased out the deduction for interest payments on loans made to purchase
consumer goods and reduced the value of the home mortgage interest de-
duction by lowering marginal tax rates.
The run-up in filing rates also followed legal changes designed to reduce
consumer filings. Bankruptcy Code Chapter 7 was amended in late 1984 to
curb excessive filings by permitting a court to reject opportunistic petitions.
Under new § 707(b), courts could dismiss a case where the debtor's dis-
charge would constitute "a substantial abuse." While that term was left un-
defined, the new provision was motivated by a concern for debtor oppor-
tunism.
Consumers are given the choice of filing under either Chapter 7 or 13.
In Chapter 7, debtors give up existing nonexempt assets but shelter future
earnings; in Chapter 13 they preserve their assets, but sacrifice some of their
future earnings. Younger debtors, with papier-mache furniture but great ex-
pectations, have thus an incentive to discharge debts under Chapter 7 which
they might without undue difficulty repay out of future earnings. Such mis-
incentives had existed before 1980, but the increase in consumer filings that
began in that year led some commentators to conclude that the bankruptcy
regime was tilted too much toward debtors. Several contemporary empirical
studies reported that the vast majority of consumer bankruptcies did not
provide for any payout to creditors and that many consumer petitioners
could have repaid their debts in a Chapter 13 plan.4
' The run-up in personal filings occurred under both Chapters 7 and 13. Chapter 7 filings
increased from 230,404 in 1981 to 573,150 in 1991, while Chapter 13 filings increased from
81,913 to 235,103 over the same period. Personal Chapter 1 I filings numbered only 597 in
1981 and 2,953 in 1991.
4 A study of 1979-82 personal bankruptcy filings reported that unsecured creditors re-
ceived nothing 97 percent of the time and on average received only 0.11 percent of their
claims. See Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code: An
Economic Analysis, 63 Ind L J 1, 38-39 (1987). See also Consumer Bankruptcy Study
(Monographs Nos 23 & 24, Purdue University, Krannert School of Management, Credit Re-
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These findings have been challenged by Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth West-
brook, and Jay Warren, who argue that debtor misbehavior concerns are
minimal in the United States.' However, the Sullivan, Westbrook, and War-
ren findings stop well short of demonstrating that American debtors are
never opportunistic. One-quarter of the wage-earning debtors had a debt/
income ratio of 70 percent or less, and a nonmortgage debt/income ratio of
40 percent or less,6 suggesting that many of them could have repaid a sub-
stantial amount of their debt under a Chapter 13 plan. Moreover, asset value
was significantly and positively associated with a Chapter 13 rather than a
Chapter 7 filing in a regression equation.7 In addition, the Sullivan, West-
brook, and Warren findings might understate the debtor opportunism prob-
lem since Chapter 7 debtors have an incentive to file for bankruptcy before
an earnings increase. For example, a recent graduate from a professional
school might truthfully report low earnings when significant pay raises are
expected within a few years. By adopting an ex post perspective, the Sulli-
van, Westbrook, and Warren study also ignores moral hazard concerns.
From an ex ante perspective, a shift in good-faith norms will lead debtors
to alter their investment strategies, and this will affect filing rates. Invest-
ments that were rejected as too risky will be taken up on a shift to laxer
good-faith norms since the debtors will have less to fear from default. They
will also borrow more heavily. When their financial gambles produce a
blank, they will truly be strapped for money. Because their strategic behav-
ior will be unobservable ex post, they will escape close good-faith scrutiny
and will resemble the ordinary Americans the Sullivan, Westbrook, and
Warren study claims they are. But from an ex ante perspective, the incen-
tive effects of a shift to laxer good-faith norms will have resulted in in-
creased filing levels.
While § 707(b) is vague, most courts came to adopt rigorous good-faith
standards to police debtor opportunism. The Chapter 7 discharge was
denied when the debtor could repay a substantial amount of his debts
in 3-5 years under a Chapter 13 plan.8 Only a minority of courts adopted
search Center 1982). See Senate Report on the Draft Bankruptcy Improvements Act of 1981,
S Rep No 97-446, 97 Cong, 2d Sess 8-14 (May 27, 1982).
' Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay L. Westbrook, As We Forgive Our Debt-
ors (1989).
6 Id at 206. Mortgage debt refers primarily to home mortgage debt. One of us has a debt/
income ratio considerably in excess of 100 percent and considers this a rational response
to home mortgage interest deductibility under the Income Tax Code. Buckley (cited in note
12).
Id at 253.
See, for example, In re Kelly, 841 F2d 908 (9th Cir 1988); In re Walton, 86 F2d 981
(8th Cir 1989).
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a laxer "totality of the circumstances" standard, where the ability to fund
a Chapter 13 plan was not a sufficient condition for the denial of a dis-
charge.'
Creditors usually receive more under a Chapter 13 plan than a Chapter 7
liquidation since the Chapter 13 plan consigns a portion of future earnings
to the bankruptcy estate. Nevertheless, Chapter 13 filings might also be op-
portunistic. First, the Chapter 7 debtor is barred from a fresh Chapter 7 peti-
tion for 6 years, but there is no such restriction for Chapter 13 debtors. Thus
a debtor might combine Chapter 7 and 13 petitions for a "Chapter 20" fil-
ing, or two Chapter 13 petitions for a "Chapter 26 filing." Even "Chapter
52" filings are not unknown.1" Second, the Chapter 13 discharge is not sub-
ject to all of Chapter 7's exceptions. For example, educational loans are not
discharged under § 523(a)(8) but are dischargeable under § 1328(a). Third,
a Chapter 13 debtor is permitted to cure defaults to secured lenders and to
modify secured loans (apart from those secured by the debtor's home)."
The concern for debtor opportunism in Chapter 13 led to a stiffening of
good-faith standards in 1984. Under § 109(g), added that year, a debtor can-
not petition under Chapter 13 if his case had been dismissed within the past
6 months for willful failure to abide by orders of the court. As well, new
§ 1325(b) provides that a creditor may require the debtor to consign all of
his projected disposable income to his creditors for a 3-year period. The
debtor's ability to convert his petition from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 con-
strains the creditor's threat advantage under § 1325(b). However, the debt-
or's strategic advantages under Chapter 7 were themselves reduced by
§ 707(b) in 1984.
In sum, the penalties for debtor opportunism were stiffened in 1984. The
post-1984 explosion in filings therefore remains a mystery, which we at-
tempt to fathom in the econometric study described in the following sec-
tions.
HI. THE DETERMINANTS OF BANKRUPTCY
This article seeks to account for the puzzle of the bankruptcy run-up
through a regression estimation of filing rates during the 1980s. We explain
filing rates as a function of three types of variables, through the reduced-
form regression equation
y = PIX, + P32X 2 + 13X 3 + e,
9 In re Green, 934 F2d 568, 572 (4th Cir 1991).
'o Re Barker, 129 BR 287 (Bankr MD Fla 1991).
Bankruptcy Code, § 1322(b).
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where
y = the district bankruptcy filing rate per adult;
X, = a vector of legal variables;
X2 = a vector of economic variables;
X3 = a vector of social and demographic variables; and
e = an error term.
We would expect the bankruptcy filing rate to depend in part on the legal
regime, which determines when opportunistic debtors are denied a dis-
charge, as well which assets are exempt from seizure by the bankruptcy
trustee. We would also expect the filing rate to be correlated with general
economic conditions, rising during depressions and falling during boom
years. In addition, the strength of social norms of promise-keeping might
affect the extent to which debtors will seek a discharge from their contracts,
while regional differences in risk aversion might explain differences in the
willingness of debtors to hazard a liquidity crisis.
A. The Legal Regime
We assume that rational debtors react to the costs that the legal regime
imposes on them. In a lax legal regime, opportunistic debtors will petition
even though they can repay their creditors; in a more rigorous regime, debt-
ors will forgo the bankruptcy option unless their backs are to the wall. This
in part explains why filing rates are higher in the United States than in Can-
ada, where legal barriers to debtor opportunism are more exacting and
where fresh-start policies are weaker. 2 Differences in the way in which
good-faith norms are interpreted might also assist in explaining regional
filing patterns within the United States. In addition, there are sharp state
law differences in the value of the assets that debtors are permitted to ex-
empt from a bankruptcy trustee under Chapter 7.13
B. Economic Factors
We would expect proxies for economic growth to be negatively corre-
lated with high filing rates. To be sure, filing rates will depend more on
unexpected volatility than on absolute values. A perfectly stable society,
12 F. H. Buckley, The American Fresh Start, 4 S Cal Interdisciplinary L J 67 (1995).
"3 Bankruptcy Code, § 522(b), permits states to opt out of the federal list of exempt assets,
and about two-thirds of the states have done so. Some states, such as Florida, have no ceiling
on the amount of assets the debtor can shelter in his homestead from his trustee. Other states
restrict the homestead exemption and feature a relatively modest list of exempt assets. Not
surprisingly, some wealthy debtors have moved from low-exemption states and purchased a
house in Florida before they filed for bankruptcy. Denise M. Topolnicki and Elizabeth M.
Macdonald, The Bankruptcy Bonanza! Money (August 1993), at 85.
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without economic fluctuations, will feature a low filing rate. The feudal
debtor, with few opportunities for advancement, did not borrow heavily and
seldom faced a liquidity crisis. Only in more prosperous economies will
debtors lever up, take risks, and encounter the reversals that propel them
into bankruptcy. High filing rates might even coexist with prosperity, as
where old industries die off and new ones are born during a period of
Shumpeterian restructuring. 4
However, this would not seem to explain the spectacular run-up in bank-
ruptcy filings during the second half of the 1980s since the economy was
as volatile in the first half of the decade. In addition, Shumpeterian theories
do not predict that proxies for economic growth will be positively corre-
lated with high filing rates in a regional study. Even in a period of restruc-
turing, some regional economies will expand while others will contract. The
1980s were a decade in which economic growth was concentrated in south-
ern and western states, while the economies of many northern and midwest-
ern states contracted. Over the period, therefore, we would anticipate that
proxies for economic decline in rustbelt states would be positively corre-
lated and that proxies for economic growth in sunbelt states would be nega-
tively correlated with bankruptcy filing rates.
C. Social Capital Theories
In the past, social scientists looked for an explanation for social patholo-
gies in economic root causes. Today, America is wealthier than ever before,
but its social problems appear more pressing. As a consequence, the focus
of attention in social science research has begun to shift to social root
causes and to social capital.
Social capital may be defined as the network benefits of individual hu-
man capital. 5 For individuals, human capital refers to intrinsic skills and
the habits of industry and cooperation that increase expected lifetime earn-
ings. Like human capital theories, social capital theories posit that wealth
depends importantly on nonmaterial factors. However, human capital is per-
sonal to the individual and can be taken with him if he emigrates, while
social capital consists in the external benefits of membership in a society
of high human capital individuals. On human capital theories, a person's
propensity to file for bankruptcy might depend on his religious sentiments;
on social capital theories, the religious sentiments of his neighbors might
'4 Joseph A. Shumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development 131 (1934).
'5 James S. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (1990); Gary S. Becker, Accounting
for Tastes (1996).
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also affect the likelihood that he will file for bankruptcy, even if he is an
atheist.
On social capital theories, the increase in filing rates might be attributed
to a decline in social sanctions for promise-breaking and the loss of a sense
of shame one feels when such values are internalized. 6 In the nineteenth
century, the stigma of bankruptcy was so strong that some debtors, like Sir
Walter Scott and Mark Twain, worked for years to repay debts that had
legally been discharged. Even 15 years ago, those who complained of
debtor opportunism were not accused of blaming the victim. More recently,
however, bankruptcy would appear to have lost much of its stigma. The
change in attitudes is likely a consequence as well as a cause of the increase
in filing rates since a social sanction is harder to maintain when a pathology
metastasizes.
A change in social attitudes might result in increased filing rates for
other, more benign, reasons. Filing rates will be low if individuals are un-
willing to assume the risk of default. The run-up in filing rates might there-
fore signal a shift to a more entrepreneurial, risk-taking society rather than
to a more pathological one.
D. The Lag from the Bankruptcy Code
Debtors will react to a liberalization of bankruptcy law in two ways.
First, insolvent debtors who might have struggled to repay their debts will
file for bankruptcy. Second, solvent debtors will adjust their investment and
financing decisions because default is less to be feared. Riskier projects will
now be accepted, and more debt will be issued. In both of these ways, bank-
ruptcy filing rates will rise. But while the increase from the first effect is
immediate, the increase from the second is not. Before the outcomes of
riskier investments are revealed, the debtor might wait years. It is possible,
therefore, that the increase in filing rates that began in 1985 in part repre-
sented a delayed reaction to the Bankruptcy Code that came into effect in
1979. 7 We therefore employed different lag times in our model, in order to
16 The suggestion that social stigma constrains consumer bankruptcies is consistent with
findings that debtors do not extract the maximum economic advantage from Chapter 7's fresh
start. Michelle White and Wendy Petropolous, What Proportion of Households Would Benefit
Financially from Bankruptcy? (working paper, Univ Michigan, Dept Economics 1996).
7 On how the Code reduced the cost of bankruptcy for consumer debtors, see Ian Domo-
witz and Thomas L. Eovaldi, The Impact of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 on Consumer
Bankruptcy, 36 J Law & Econ 803 (1993). For studies reporting a significant increase in
filing rates after the introduction of the new Code, see W. J. Boyes and R. L. Faith, Some
Effects of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 29 J Law & Econ 139 (1986); R. L. Peterson
and K. Aoki, Bankruptcy Filings before and after Implementation of the Bankruptcy Reform
Law, 36 J Econ & Bus 95 (1984); Lawrence Shepard, Personal Failures and the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, 27 J Law & Econ 419 (1984). Domowitz and Eovaldi failed to detect
a significant increase in filing rates, but this might be attributable to their use of a personal
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test whether filing rates responded to a change in legal variables after a de-
lay of longer periods of time.
E. Transaction Costs and Credit Card Availability
Data problems prevented us from testing two further explanations for the
run-up in filing rates. On transaction-cost theories, filing rates increased in
the 1980s because the cost of legal services to debtors declined. Alterna-
tively, the run-up in consumer filings might be attributed to increased ac-
cess to consumer credit. 8
Transaction-cost theories plausibly explain part of the increase in filings,
though likely not the major part. For some petitioners during the period, the
price of legal services fell because of competition from low-cost paralegals.
In the Sullivan, Westbrook, and Warren survey, only 4 percent of 1981
debtors were not represented by lawyers. 9 By 1991-92, however, parale-
gals in one California district prepared 14 percent of the consumer filings.
20
In addition, the growth in lawyer advertising during the 1980s likely in-
creased the competition for legal services and reduced legal fees for
debtors.
2'
We are skeptical that increased access to credit explains much of the in-
crease in filing rates. Homeowners had adequate access to credit through
the first and second mortgage markets. Of nonhomeowners, some likely had
increased access to credit cards during the 1980s, though it is not clear
whether this made a great difference in leverage rates. During the period,
U.S. credit card debt rose only from 3.8 percent to 4.8 percent as a percent
of total personal income.22 However, we had no regional data on credit card
availability or credit card debt. We had regional data on total personal
leverage levels but chose not to employ a total leverage predictor. Most
debtors had the same access to credit throughout the decade. As well, intro-
ducing a total leverage predictor would have given rise to vexed multicol-
linearity concerns. Consumer borrowing levels will depend on the legal and
leverage predictor since debtors would have levered up in anticipation of a more liberal
Bankruptcy Code. Bhandari and Weiss also employed a personal leverage predictor and
failed to detect a significant filing increase. Jagdeep S. Bhandari and Lawrence A. Weiss,
The Increasing Bankruptcy Filing Rate: An Historical Analysis, 67 Am Bankr L J 1 (1993).
" Sullivan et al, at 133 (cited in note 5).
19 Id at 23.
20 Susan Block-Lieb, A Comparison of Pro Bono Representation Programs for Consumer
Debtors, 2 Am Bankr Inst L Rev 37, 40 (1994).
2 Terry Calvani, James Langenfeld, and Gordon Shuford, Attorney Advertising and Com-
petition at the Bar, 41 Vand L Rev 761 (1988).
22 Our data source is the Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1994 (using 1990 dol-
lars).
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social sanctions for default. When the social penalty weakens, for example,
debtors will borrow more heavily, having less to fear from default. Lever-
age ratios would might then have increased because the cost of default had
declined and not because credit was more easily available.
IV. OUR MODEL
The following reports on a test of the determinants of personal bank-
ruptcy, in which filing levels were regressed on socioeconomic variables
over the 12-year period from 1980 to 1991. The equations we used to esti-
mate filing levels were of the form
In TOTAL,= 1=, 1985 + 12 In EXEMit- + Pr3 In UNEMI,_j
+ 10, In POVERTY,- 1 + 1+5 In MIGi,_I
+ 16 In METROj,_j + 10, In CATHi,-I (1)
+ 18 In ELDER,_ + 19 In DIVit-1
+ P31 YEAR + 131,...,86 DIST + es,,
In SEVEN, = 13 1985 + 132 In EXEMj,_ + 153 In UNEMjtj
+ P4 in POVERTYi,-1 + 15 In MIGi,_-
+ 16 In METROi,_, + 17 In CATH,_ (2)
+ 18 In ELDERI,_1 + 19 In DIVj,_
+ 1Plo YEAR + 11.86 DIST + ei,,
and
In THIRTEEN, = 13 1985 + 132 CASE13i,, + 13 In UNEM,-I
± 14 In POVERTYi,_, + P35 In MIGj,-1
+ 136 In METRO,-, + 17 In CATHj,_ (3)
+ 138 In ELDERi,-, + P9 in DIVi,-I
± 010 YEAR + 1....86 DIST + e,,
where the variables are defined as provided in the Appendix, and where
51 .....6 = regression coefficients;
e = residual;
i = 1, 2. 86 index for bankruptcy filing districts; and





Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum
TOTAL 2.4583 1.7457 .13440 15.480
SEVEN 1.7374 1.0808 .12151 6.4135
THIRTEEN .72091 1.0406 .00000 11.380
EXEM 38,260 36,027 1,310 138,000
UNEM 7.1224 2.3710 2.2000 2.2000
POVERTY 14.623 4.2736 2.9000 29.000
MIG 9.5140 3.8584 4.0951 20.557
METRO 66.311 20.642 15.000 15.000
CATH 18.193 13.020 1.6000 65.800
ELDER 11.977 1.8833 7.4606 18.150
DIV 5.2094 5.2094 2.3000 9.1000
A. Estimation Technique
We employed a log-log model after determining, through a Box-Cox esti-
mation of the untransformed data, that it was appropriate to do so.
23
Our study estimates average filings rates at the level of each judicial dis-
trict through district- and state-level legal and socioeconomic predictors. It
is a fallacy to suppose that because the consumer bankruptcy decision is
made by an individual, it cannot usefully be studied with aggregate data.
Societies also have their own character, and one's propensity to file a bank-
ruptcy petition may depend on where and when one lives. While a panel
study of individual petitioners might incorporate state-level independent
variables, the dependent variable would still be the individual bankruptcy
decision. In a society-level study, by contrast, societal predictors are em-
ployed to estimate a society-level dependent variable, which must be the
dependent variable of greatest interest on social capital theories.
Our reliance on time-series, cross-sectional data heightens concerns
about idiosyncratic state factors not captured by the other variables. The
filing decision across districts may be influenced by a variety of political,
social, and economic factors not captured by our model. Because of this, we
employed a fixed-effects model, with a separate intercept for each state.24
' The Box-Cox k was 0.23 for the first equation. Box-Cox transformations are discussed
in George C. Judge, R. Carter Hill, William E. Griffiths, Helmut Lutkepohl, and Tsoung-
Chao Lee, Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Econometrics 555-56 (Wiley, 2d ed
1987).
' On the need to employ a fixed-state effect model for time-series, cross-sectional data,
see Gary Becker, Comments on Danzon, Maki, Murray, and Allen, 11 J Labor Econ S326
(1993). We performed a Hausman test for omitted variables and were able to reject the null
hypothesis that fixed-state and year effects are independent of the explanatory variables in
cross-sectional specifications.
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In the principal regressions, the dependent variables were lagged 1 year.
Because bankruptcy data are reported with a June 30 year-end, the lag was
actually 6 months. However, we also estimated filing rates with lag times
of 18, 30, and 42 months in an attempt to determine whether part of the
run-up in rates might have been a delayed reaction to the introduction of
the Bankruptcy Code in 1979. There was very little difference in our results
when we used a 6- and an 18-month lag time. For longer lag times, the
independent variables had much less explanatory power.25 We concluded
that a 6-month lag was as reasonable as any lag time we could easily select.
Federal district level data were obtained by aggregating county data
available through the Regional Economic Information System of the Bureau
of Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce. Where county-level data
were unavailable, we employed state-level data, obtained from the Statisti-
cal Abstract of the United States unless otherwise indicated.
B. The Dependent Variables
Our model's dependent variables are voluntary personal filings under
Chapters 7 and 13, as well as both chapters together, divided by the adult
population, for 86 federal judicial districts from 1980 to 1991.26 All of our
cases commenced under the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, which reports filings
with a year-end of June 30 of each year. Since there were no Bankruptcy
Code filings for the first 3 months of the 1980 year, from July to September
1979, we applied a 4/3 multiplier to the reported rates for that year.
We estimated filing rates for Chapters 7 and 13 separately because debtor
opportunism concerns are more pressing under Chapter 7. As well, we were
able to construct a case-law variable measuring judicial good-faith stan-
dards under Chapter 13 but not under Chapter 7.
Debtor use of Chapter 13 varies widely, ranging from 0.2 (North Dakota)
to 22.5 (Tennessee) per 1,000 adults from 1985 to 1991, with a mean of
4.4 and a standard deviation of 4.6. Because of this, the pattern of combined
filings under both chapters might look quite different from that of the two
chapters when considered separately. We therefore estimated the combined
filing rate in a third set of regression equations.
We did not include filings under Chapters 11 or 12, which often straddle
the boundary between business and consumer filings. In any event, con-
sumer Chapter 11 filings constituted only 0.3 percent of total consumer fil-
2 Data and results are available from us on request.
26 Our data source is the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. We excluded
Alaska and Hawaii because we employed a migration predictor and Nevada because we em-
ployed a divorce predictor.
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ings in 1991, while Chapter 12 filings (family farmers) were 0.2 percent of
the total.
C. Legal Predictors
We employed three legal variables: 1985, EXEM, and CASE13. The
1985 dummy variable took the value of zero before 1985 and one in 1985
or thereafter. On the assumption that the Bankruptcy Code amendments that
came into effect in late 1984 served to police debtor opportunism, we
would expect the 1985 coefficient to have a negative sign in all regressions.
The variable EXEM is our estimate of the maximum real value of assets
exempt from seizure in Chapter 7 by unsecured creditors under Bankruptcy
Code § 522(d) or the state law equivalent.27 Any estimate of the value of
the exemption is highly subjective. Ours assumed that petitioners were un-
der 65, married with two minor children, and owned tools worth $2,000,
clothes worth $1,000, provisions and fuel worth $1,000, household furniture
worth $5,000, a ring worth $1,000, and home equity worth $100,000. No
value was ascribed to the more obscure species of exempt assets, such as
family portraits or burial lots. We might easily have come up with any num-
ber of other bases for estimating the value of exempt assets but think our
method as reasonable as any. In any event, our results were little changed
when we made several obvious changes to the basis of estimation. 28 With a
greater level of exemptions, bankruptcy becomes more attractive, and our
model predicts that the EXEM coefficient will have a positive sign.
Bankruptcy Code good-faith norms repose a great deal of discretion in
the trier of fact, and as noted courts differ greatly in the way they exercise
this discretion. We therefore sought to test whether differential good-faith
norms affected the bankruptcy decision by constructing a case-law dummy
variable. There were too few cases decided under Bankruptcy Code
§ 707(b) to do so for Chapter 7, but few sections of the Code are more
heavily litigated than § 1325(a)(3). After eliminating noncontroversial
cases, we were left with 219 reported cases where courts appeared to tip
their hand, revealing either relatively lax or strict good-faith standards. 29 In
27 Data are available from us on request.
2 Data are available from us on request.
29 Data are available from us on request. We excluded cases involving what seemed to us
egregious misbehavior, including cases where the petition was denied because the debtor
sought to scale down obligations to his children or ex-wife. We also excluded Circuit Court
of Appeal decisions since we thought that they provided only limited information as to how
a trial court would resolve a fact-sensitive inquiry into debtor opportunism. In addition, we
believed that our case-law variable would better predict filing levels than a variable that sim-
ply measured how often good-faith norms were invoked by creditors, trustees, or courts. A
district where good-faith norms are seldom invoked might be one where debtor opportunism
is not sanctioned; alternatively, good-faith norms might be so exacting that few opportunistic
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some districts, the cases seemed split, and these we discarded, unless they
appeared to evidence a temporal trend. With the remaining cases we con-
structed a CASE13 variable, which took the value of one if the district was
deemed to take a lax approach to debtor misbehavior under Chapter 13, and
zero otherwise. Since lax good-faith standards invite opportunistic filings,
we expected that the CASE13 variable would have a positive sign.
D. Economic Predictors
Our economic predictors were UNEM and POVERTY. We would expect
filing rates to be countercyclical, with high bankruptcy levels in depressed
times or districts. We therefore expected that both coefficients would have
a positive sign.
E. Social Predictors
In Section H we suggested that bankruptcy filing rates would depend on
the strength of certain social norms. In particular, we hypothesize that filing
rates are dependant on (1) the strength of social networks, (2) conservative
and hierarchal attitudes, and (3) the social stigma of promise-breaking. We
employ our MIG and METRO variables as proxies for the strength of social
networks, our CATH and ELDER variables as proxies for conservative and
hierarchical attitudes, and our DIVORCE variable as a proxy for the social
stigma of promise-breaking.
Social sanctions are strengthened by social networks and weakened by
anonymity. We would therefore expect higher filing rates in high-migration
districts.3" Reputational concerns are weaker when one has recently moved
to a state or when one's circle of friends constantly changes because of mi-
gration. As a measure of the alienation caused by migration, our MIG vari-
able represents per capita migration into a state from another state plus in-
tercounty migration within a state.
The METRO variable represents the percent of the population living in
a metropolitan area. We would expect urbanization to be linked with in-
creased filing rates since social norms are plausibly weaker in cities than
in smaller towns. As well, aspiring entrepreneurs, who are more willing to
risk financial disaster, are more likely to be found in cities. Finally, the
debtors will file for bankruptcy in that district. Then, too, a heavy volume of litigation might
merely suggest that good-faith norms are particularly vague in that district.
" A similar explanation has been offered for the high divorce rates in high-migration re-
gions. Norval D. Glenn and Michael Supancic, The Social and Demographic Correlates of
Divorce and Separation in the United States: An Update and Reconsideration, 47 J Mar-
riage & Family 563 (1984); Norval D. Glenn and Beth Ann Shelton, Regional Differences
in Divorce in the United States, 47 J Marriage & Family 641 (1985).
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METRO variable might be a proxy for lower transaction costs. City resi-
dents are likely to have easier access to attorneys, trustees, and bankruptcy
courts.
We would also expect lower filing rates in conservative and hierarchical
societies and higher rates in egalitarian and populist societies. A conserva-
tive society frowns on bounders; an egalitarian society champions new men.
A hierarchical society deplores the iconoclast; a populist society defends
the rule breaker. This plausibly explains part of the difference between Ca-
nadian and American filing rates and may also explain regional differences
within the United States.
We would expect that members of mainline religions are socially more
conservative than their fellows." We lacked data for other establishment re-
ligions but were able to measure the percentage of Catholics in each state.32
Catholicism is the most hierarchical religion and is far and away the largest
mainline sect in the United States. Filing rates in CATHOLIC regions
might also be lower if Catholics are less entrepreneurial and more risk-
averse than Protestants, as Max Weber famously argued.33
We would also expect the elderly to be socially more conservative than
their fellows. The ELDER variable represents the percent of a state's popu-
lation that is over 65. In addition, we expected that those who lived on fixed
incomes would be less ready to take economic risks.
Finally, we would expect promise-breaking in bankruptcy to be related
to other social vices. Personal bankruptcy is, if anything, a white-collar
form of misbehavior. As such, we would not expect it to be strongly corre-
lated with social vices more closely associated with an underclass, such as
violent crime and illegitimacy. However, we hypothesize that the desire for
a fresh start from creditors bears a family resemblance to a desire for a fresh
start from spouses and that patterns of promise-breaking in divorce might
usefully predict bankruptcy filing rates.
Our DIVORCE predictor represents per capita divorce rates. First, di-
vorce rates might be positively correlated with bankruptcy rates in two
ways. If the social stigma of promise-breaking is weakened across the
" On membership in mainline religions as a proxy for conservative and hierarchical social
norms, see Seymour Martin Lipset, Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the
United States and Canada 88-89 (1990). For a review of the literature (which does not dis-
tinguish amongst denominations) on how religious beliefs may influence behavior, see James
W. Clark and Lyndon E. Dawson, Personal Religiousness and Ethical Judgements: An Em-
pirical Analysis, 15 J Bus Ethics 359 (1996). Many religious people appear to regard the
morality of personal bankruptcy as doubtful. James R. Sutherland, The Ethics of Bankruptcy:
A Biblical Perspective, 7 J Bus Ethics 917 (1988).
3 Our data source is the Official Catholic Directory (P. J. Kennedy & Sons in association
with R. R. Bowker, Reed Reference 1970-91).
" Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1930).
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board, then divorce and bankruptcy rates might both increase. Second, an
increase in the divorce rate might directly affect bankruptcy rates because
divorce results in financial distress.
F. Endogenous Variables
While we hypothesize that filing rates are affected by divorce rates, cau-
sation may work in the other direction as well. Divorce rates may be higher
as a consequence of higher bankruptcy levels. Some people go bankrupt
because they divorce, and some people divorce because they go bankrupt.
The MIG variable might also be endogenous. While migration might
weaken social networks and lead to increased filing rates, increased filing
rates might also affect migration levels. To the extent that a region's high
bankruptcy rates signal economic distress, some migrants will avoid it. And
to the extent that its high filing rates signal relaxed social and legal norms,
deadbeat migrants will be attracted to it.34
We addressed endogeneity problems in two ways. First, we lagged the
divorce predictor (and most independent variables) by a year. That is, we
estimated how filing levels in year 2 were affected by divorces in year 1.
Lagging predictors reduces (but does not eliminate) concerns about the di-
rection of causation, insofar as causes precede consequences. We were un-
able to lag the MIG predictor, however, since yearly migration flows were
not available.
Second, we estimated filing rates through a two-stage least squares tech-
nique, in which bankruptcy, divorce, and migration rates were jointly esti-
mated. To do so, we employed 1985, YEAR, and the district dummy vari-
ables as instrumental variables, as well as three new instrumental variables:
INCOME, AFDC, and MARRIAGE. The variable INCOME is per-adult in-
come; AFDC is the average payout per family of four under the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children program; and MARRIAGE is the per
capita number of married couples.
V. RESULTS
Our results are found in Tables 2 and 3, which report on our estimates
of total Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 consumer filing rates. Table 2 employs
ordinary least squares and Kmenta pooling estimation techniques, while Ta-
ble 3 employs a two-stage least squares estimation of filing and divorce
rates. While social predictors generally had the expected signs, economic
and legal variables appear unable to account for the run-up in filing rates.
' Margaret F. Brinig and F. H. Buckley, The Market for Deadbeats, 25 J Legal Stud 201
(1996).
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TABLE 3
THE DETERMINANTS OF PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY FILING RATES, 1980-91
Variable Name TOTAL SEVEN THIRTEEN




In UNEM -. 16658 -. 17979 .070129
(-2.409)** (-2.369)** (.4116)
In POVERTY .33996 .15197 1.1217
(4.168)** (1.523) (5.446)**
In MIG .20806 .17850 -. 13697
(2.220)** (1.780)* (-.6490)
In METRO .30731 .073201 1.1733
(6.596)** (1.483) (9.931)**
In CATH -.11529 .10881 -.53586
(-4.416)** (3.889)** (-8.466)**
In ELDER -. 20678 -. 058321 -2.1907
(-2.024)** (-.5229) (-9.293)**
In DIV .64070 .93034 -1.2981
(5.776)** (7.721)** (-5.058)**
N 1,032 1,032 456
SE .60626 .64232 .95071
Sum of errors 376.37 422.48 404.92
R
2 between observed and predicted .2277 .1196 .4550
NOTE.-A two-stage least squares fixed-district-effects estimation is used; MIG and DIV are endoge-
nous variables.
• Significant at the 10% level (two-tailed test).
•* Significant at the 5% level (two-tailed test).
Diagnostic tests on ordinary least squares estimates revealed the presence
of autocorrelation. Because of this, we employed the Kmenta pooling
method when we were able to do so."
In Table 3, the 1985 coefficient was uniformly positive, and it was statis-
tically significant in all but one specification. If the 1984 Bankruptcy Code
revisions were meant to reduce the level of debtor opportunism, there is no
evidence that they had this result.
We had expected that exemption levels would be positively correlated
with filing rates. Our EXEM coefficient was indeed positive and significant
in the second, fourth, and sixth specifications of Table 2. However, it was
35 Jan Kmenta, Elements of Econometrics 509-12 (1971). Under the Kmenta method, fil-
ing rates are estimated through a generalized least squares procedure, which assumes cross-
sectional heteroskedasticity and timewise autoregression and transforms the observations
with cross-sectionally independent autoregressive parameters.
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insignificant, and was negative and significant in Table 3's two-stage least
squares estimation.
One explanation for our failure to find a significant, positive EXEM coef-
ficient is that the exemptions provide a very limited shield against secured
lenders 6.3 Many debtors will have pledged most of their assets before bank-
ruptcy in order to fend it off. In particular, few homeowners will file for
bankruptcy without a mortgage over their house.37 The highly publicized
migration of debtors to high-exemption states such as Florida would thus
appear limited to a small group of wealthy deadbeats. A second possible
explanation is that higher exemption levels reduce the ability of high-risk
debtors to borrow.38 A third possible explanation is that married debtors
might shelter their houses under tenancies by the entireties in states with
low homestead exemptions.
39
The CASE13 coefficient was unexpectedly negative in the fifth and sixth
specifications of Table 2 but positive and significant in the third specifica-
tion of Table 3. This offers but weak support for the hypothesis that judicial
sanctions strongly constrain debtor opportunism. One possible explanation
for this result is that legal norms are endogenous and that courts are more
ready to police debtor bad faith when filing rates increase.
Our model's economic variables had a mixed success in predicting filing
rates. The UNEM coefficient was positive and significant in Table 2 but
was negative in Table 3. The POVERTY coefficient was not positive and
significant in any specification in Table 2.
By contrast, our model's social variables more successfully predicted fil-
ing rates. The MIG coefficients were generally positive and significant ex-
cept in Chapter 13 estimations. This is consistent with the hypothesis that
filing rates are higher in regions where social networks are weaker.
The CATH and ELDER coefficients were generally negative and sig-
nificant, consistent with the hypothesis that filing rates are lower in socially
conservative regions. Again, but for the Chapter 13 estimations, the DI-
VORCE coefficients were generally positive and significant, consistent with
the hypothesis that-filing rates are higher when social sanctions for promise-
36 However, debtors may avoid nonpurchase-money security interests in the personal chat-
tels listed in Bankruptcy Code, § 522(f)(1)(B).
" More than half of the debtors in the Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook study were home-
owners, only slightly less than the 64 percent of nonbankrupts and dependents who are home-
owners. Sullivan et al, at 129 (cited in note 5).
. " Reint Gropp, John Scholz, and Michelle White, Personal Bankruptcy and Credit Supply
and Demand (Working Paper No 5653, National Bureau of Economic Research 1996).
19 See Douglas G. Baird and Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy: Cases, Problems, and Ma-
terials 890-94 (2d ed 1990). This strategy will not avail against creditors to whom both
spouses are obligated.
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breaking are weaker. The failure to detect significant positive coefficients
in Chapter 13 estimations may be attributed to idiosyncratic judicial prefer-
ences as to the choice of filing chapter in the various districts.
These findings suggest that econometric analyses of consumer filing rates
are .seriously incomplete if social predictors are excluded. As noted, social
capital theories might attribute the run-up in filing rates either to a decline
in social sanctions for promise-breaking or to a greater propensity for risk-
taking. Our model does not permit a sharp distinction between these com-
peting hypotheses. Nevertheless, we suspect that the United States was as
entrepreneurial at the beginning as at the end of the 1980s and that the in-
creased bankruptcy filing rate is more plausibly attributed to a decline in
social sanctions.
If the run-up in filing rates during the 1980s may in part be attributed to
weaker social sanctions, this may also explain the model's significant time
trends, as seen in the significant positive 1985 and YEAR coefficients. Le-
gal variables do not explain why filing rates increased over the period, and
economic variables are ordinarily unable to account for sharp discontinu-
ities in behavior. Nature does not make jumps, said Alfred Marshall. But it
may make a jump on a change in social norms, such as one has observed
in recent years. The skeptic who thinks otherwise will have a very difficult
time accounting for recent changes in illegitimacy rates or in consumer
bankruptcy filing rates.4
VI. CONCLUSION
This article presents new evidence on the determinants of personal bank-
ruptcies for the 12-year period following the introduction of the new Bank-
ruptcy Code in 1979. This period saw an explosion in filing rates that can-
not easily be explained through economic predictors since the increase
overlapped with the Reagan recovery and crested with the 1991 recession.
Moreover, the increase coincided with the adoption of stronger statutory
barriers to debtor opportunism. More than anything, we suggest, the in-
crease in filing rates is attributable to changes in social norms.
APPENDIX
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES
TOTAL = Total consumer bankruptcy filings under Chapters 7 and 13 divided
by the adult population.
4 Margaret F. Brinig and F. H. Buckley, The Price of Virtue, Public Choice (1997, in
press), at figure 1.
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SEVEN = Consumer bankruptcy filings under Chapter 7 divided by the adult
population.
THIRTEEN = Consumer bankruptcy filings under Chapter 13 divided by the adult
population.
1985 = Dummy variable taking the value of zero before 1985, one
afterward.
EXEM = Estimate of total value of assets exempt from seizure by a Chapter 7
bankruptcy trustee.
CASE13 = Dummy variable taking the value of one if decisions in a district
indicate a lax approach to debtor opportunism, zero otherwise.
UNEM = Average of monthly unemployment rates.
POVERTY = Percentage of the population living below the federal poverty line.
MIG = Per capita interstate migration into a state plus intercounty moves
within a state, 1985-90.
METRO = Percent of population living in a standard metropolitan statistical
area.
CATH = Percentage of the population identified as Catholic.
ELDER = Percent of population over 65.
DIV = Divorces per 1,000 population.
YEAR = Time trend, 1980-91.
DIST = Dummy variable for 86 federal judicial districts.

